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هذه الصفحة غير متوفرة باللغة العربية وهي معروضة باللغة English

التقرير

1 نوفمبر 2024

الكاتب:
Globalworks Lund AB

Report: State-imposed Forced Labour and State-sponsored Global Logistics in Ultra-fast Fashion

[...] In our third and final study, we examine Shein and Temu’s operations and violations of human and labour rights against the backdrop of Chinese state policies and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence.

We show that Shein and Temu are associated with a very high risk of state-imposed forced labour due to the two brands key role in the construction of a large-scale industrial park. The park is part of a state-led industrial policy initiative with the aim to integrate the country’s cotton production base in Xinjiang with the fashion sector in Guangdong.

Shein and Temu and their Guangzhou-based ultra-fast fashion clusters are relocating to this park. As a result, Shein and Temu are poised to become major gateways for cotton farms and spinneries in Xinjiang, and by extension state-imposed forced labour, into global consumer markets. We also present information on PDD’s (Temu’s parent company) involvement in state-organised poverty alleviation programmes in Xinjiang. This may explain Temu’s non-committal response to the US Congress investigation where the company refrains from prohibiting products made in Xinjiang to be sold on their platform.

Shein and Temu are at the forefront of a Chinese government initiative to shift away from supplying foreign brands and towards linking Chinese producers directly with consumers globally. Our report shows that the two enterprises benefit from a Party State controlled global logistics network. Access to and preferential treatment within this global logistics network may be related to nationalist objectives such as the primary use of Xinjiang cotton or participation in industrial poverty alleviation programmes. The Chinese government’s influence over the two companies’ operations suggests that their competitive advantage is partially derived from state-support and backed by state-coercive means.

We conclude that where human and labour rights violations are tied to state policies or correspond to CCP objectives, the two corporations have neither political leeway nor economic incentives to adhere to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the legislations that build on them.

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