Ukrainian Govt exposes foreign technology fuelling Russia's war: Overwhelming majority of manufacturers remain silent
On 30 July 2024, the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (GUR) launched an open database of foreign equipment used by Russia in the production of weapons. As of 28 October 2024, it contains information about 961 machine tools manufactured by 225 foreign companies, which are used by 153 plants in Russia to make weapons for attacks on Ukraine.
Germany is home to by far the highest number of companies (60 or 27%) whose equipment is used by the Russian Government to manufacture weapons like missiles, bombs, military satellites, military aircrafts and helicopters, warships, artillery and ammunition. It is followed by Taiwan, with 26 companies in the database, USA and Japan (20 companies each), Switzerland (19 companies) and Italy (16 companies).
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre reached out to 218 companies whose equipment is listed in the database asking them to comment on its inclusion. We were unable to approach the remaining seven companies due to a lack of publicly available contact information.
We received responses from just 23 companies, 11% of those approached. Among the top six countries represented in the database, companies headquartered in Japan have been the most responsive, recording a 25 % response rate (five responses out of 20). Swiss companies have shown 11% response rate (two companies out of 19), while German companies’ response rate constitutes a mere 10 % (six responses out of 60). Response rate of companies headquartered in Italy is 6% (one response out of 16). The situation is similar for the US companies whose response rate is just 5% (one out of 20). No companies headquartered in Taiwan provided a response, despite the proliferation of Taiwanese firms in the database.
The most common response we received from companies was that they suspended or stopped all transactions with Russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, in full compliance with sanctions. Some companies, including PerkinElmer (USA), TESCAN (Czech Republic), DISCO Corporation (Japan) and PEGAS-GONDA (Czech Republic), pointed out that the equipment added to the database had been sold to Russia prior to the full-scale invasion. This fact even prompted one company to advise us privately to pay more attention to the facts in future. While Maier Werkzeugmachinen (Germany) chose to accuse us publicly of blackmail stating the following in its official response: “Under no circumstances will we accept to be blackmail[ed] or forced into a situation where we give any information about us or our customers to any other then the German Authorities, especially not an intelligence agency of a foreign country.” Based on the responses we received, most companies do not seem to understand that they are responsible for how their products are used.
Under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), companies are expected to conduct ongoing human rights due diligence (HRDD) to identify and address any human rights impacts associated with their business activities, products and services. In conflict-affected areas businesses should conduct a ‘heightened’ version of HRDD because of heightened risks to human rights in conflict situations. Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine began in 2014. This means all companies that had business relationships with Russia at that time should have started implementing heightened HRDD throughout their supply chains to make sure their products did not contribute to human rights harms.
A few companies managed to provide examples of measures introduced to enhance due diligence in their supply chains. According to Spinner (Germany), when the company becomes aware that a used Spinner CNC machine has been exported to Russia by a third party “then this machine will immediately be noted as “blocked” with its serial number and will be cut off from customer service, software updates, spare parts supply, etc.” Sodick (Japan) reported that prior to each sale of its machinery the company conducts “a thorough investigation of...[its] customer and verif[ies] if...[the] machine tool is intended to be used for civil purpose, not for development of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] or other type of weapons.” Hottinger Brüel & Kjaer (Denmark) said the company seeks “a contractual undertaking from...customers to not sell, export or re-export any of...products to the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus”. However, it is unclear why the company banned users with Ukraine IP addresses from accessing its website.
It should also be noted that the responses varied significantly in the level of detail provided. For example, TMJ Strojírna Jesenice (Czech Republic) simply stated “Machine shown on the video has not been produced in the recent years by our company STROJIRNA JESENICE s.r.o.” without providing any further detail. Even though ONA ELECTROEROSION (Spain) similarly stated the equipment added to the database had never been delivered to Russia, it provided very detailed information from its sales records about all deliveries to Russia to date. The company also reported that as part of an export control assessment it always verifies “that the end user is not on any sanctions or embargo lists, and...require[s] a written statement from the end user as to the specific purpose for which...[the] equipment will be used and that it will be for civilian use only.”
Just one company ABBA (Switzerland) stated it takes the concerns we raised very seriously and reported it had “initiated an internal review to gather more information”. The company also promised to address any findings in accordance with the company's compliance procedures, applicable laws and regulations.
This extremely low level of transparency is shocking given that the equipment manufactured by these companies is allegedly used by Russia to make weapons needed for attacks on Ukraine – many of which have been labelled as war crimes because they target civilian infrastructure and result in numerous civilian deaths. According to the President of Ukraine, Russia’s army has committed at least 137,000 war crimes in Ukraine. On 17 March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, for alleged war crimes involving forced deportation of Ukrainian children. On 24 June 2024, arrest warrants were issued for former Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov for alleged international crimes, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Russian army in Ukraine.
All companies which provide Russia with technologies needed for weapons production contribute to these crimes. They also risk being accused of complicity in war crimes. To minimise this risk, it is crucial for companies to take immediate action.
The following recommendations, developed by the Ukrainian Government, include very concrete steps companies should take to enhance due diligence in their supply chains:
- create a list of equipment (tools, spare parts, technical fluids and software) whose deliveries require enhanced risk-based due diligence;
- approve and regularly update due diligence procedures taking into account recommendations, red-flags, sanctions circumvention schemes, spread them, oblige their foreign productions, counterparties and contractors to comply with them, introduce liability for violations (including during the sale of used equipment);
- use GPS trackers to control the end user, remote control systems to shut down the equipment in case of violations;
- introduce on-site inspections at the place of equipment installation (repair, service, software installation); and
- respond to detection of new cases of equipment use by aggressors - investigate, investigate supply chains, inform involved parties and governments, take measures to stop supplies.
Recommendations for governments can be found here.
All company responses and non-responses are available below.