Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: comprehensive EU’s 14th package of sanctions cracks down on circumvention and adopts energy measures, 24 June 2024

The Council adopted today a 14th package of economic and individual restrictive measures dealing a further blow to Putin’s regime and those who perpetuate his illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine.

These measures are designed to target high-value sectors of the Russian economy, like energy, finance and trade, and make it ever more difficult to circumvent EU sanctions...

Today’s package includes restrictive measures on additional 116 individuals and entities responsible for actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine...

In order to ensure that EU facilities are not used to tranship Russian liquified natural gas (LNG) to third countries, and thereby reduce the significant revenues that Russia derives from LNG sale and transport, the EU will forbid reloading services of Russian LNG in EU territory for the purpose of transshipment operations to third countries. This covers both ship-to-ship transfers and ship-to-shore transfers, as well as re-loading operations, and does not affect import but only re-export to third countries via the EU. The European Commission will monitor the implementation and development of this decision and may propose mitigating measures if necessary.

Furthermore, the EU will prohibit new investments, as well as the provision of goods, technology and services for the completion of LNG projects under construction, such as Arctic LNG 2 and Murmansk LNG. Import restrictions are introduced on Russian LNG through EU terminals not connected to the natural gas system...

The EU is equipping itself with additional tools to crack down on circumvention.

First of all, EU parent companies will be required to undertake their best efforts to ensure that their third-country subsidiaries do not take part in any activities resulting in an outcome that the sanctions seek to prevent.

Second, in order to help counter the re-exportation of battlefield goods found in Ukraine or critical to the development of Russian military systems, it was decided that EU operators selling such battlefield goods to third countries will need to implement due diligence mechanisms capable of identifying and assessing risks of re-exportation to Russia, and mitigating them.

In addition, EU operators transferring industrial know-how for the production of battlefield goods to third-country commercial counterparts will now have to include contractual provisions to ensure that such know-how will not be used for goods intended to Russia...

In addition, EU operators will be barred from making transactions with specifically listed entities using SPFS outside of Russia.

Furthermore, the Council is introducing a ban on transactions with targeted credit and financial institutions and crypto assets providers established outside of the EU, when these entities facilitate transactions that support Russia’s defence-industrial base through the export, supply, sale, transfer or transport towards Russia of dual-use goods and technology, sensitive items, battlefield goods, firearms and ammunition...

The Council added 61 new entities to the list of those directly supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex in its war of aggression against Ukraine. They will be subject to tighter export restrictions concerning dual use goods and technologies, as well as goods and technology which might contribute to the technological enhancement of Russia’s defence and security sector. Some of these entities are located in third countries (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates) and have been involved in the circumvention of trade restrictions and engaged in the procurement of sensitive items used for example in the production of drones, or providing material support for Russian military operations...