"Addressing the challenge of transnational human rights violations in the UK"

A new briefing from the Rights Practice in collaboration with FairSquare captures the outcomes of two workshops exploring the experiences of members of the UK’s diaspora and activist communities who are targets of transnational repression by autocratic states, and the law and policy responses to TNR.

The term transnational repression (TNR) is widely used within diaspora communities and among legislators and researchers to describe the range of techniques used by autocratic states to spread fear and silence critics located outside their borders. The threat to individuals and communities in the UK – including human rights defenders and activists – is real and reflects the immense unchecked power states enjoy in their own territory and their willingness to deploy such powers abroad.

A January 2024 Rights Practice and FairSquare workshop brought together participants from Arab states, Iran, Hong Kong, Tibetan and Uyghur communities, to discuss their experience and, as persons affected by transnational repression, what they wanted and needed from the UK government and civil society. All had direct experience of being targeted in the UK by persons they believed to be acting on behalf of their home country. They described a broad range of largely similar techniques that had been used against them including stalking, harassment and physical threats (in some cases death threats); coercion by proxy of family members in their home country; digital surveillance including phone hacking; financial sanctions such as confiscation of property and freezing assets; disinformation and online identity theft, as well as having legal cases being brought against them.

A key aim of transnational repression is to restrict negative coverage of the perpetrator country. Media suppression extends beyond borders with opposition media organisations being listed as terrorist organisations and lists of opposition journalists published on government websites. Autocratic states have made use of powerful spyware, such as hacking software Pegasus, to monitor the phones of targets including journalists and dissidents. Participants also described how fake social media accounts had been set up in the names of dissidents, spreading disinformation and undermining their reputation. Workshop participants noted state efforts to abuse administrative powers. For example, embassy responsibilities to issue passports and birth certificates are being used as leverage over dissidents, either trapping them or their families in-country or preventing them from returning. Belarus and Egypt were both criticised by attendees for this practice. Hong Kong’s National Security Law and Article 23 legislation gives new domestic security laws extraterritorial reach. Last year, the Hong Kong police issued arrest warrants and offered HK$ 1 million bounties leading to the arrest of overseas activists, including several in the UK. [...]