Bringing accountability to overseas development: a comparative perspective from Japanese civil society, 18 Jan 2024

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In earlier articles, Panda Paw Dragon Claw has engaged with observers and practitioners of Japanese foreign aid on their observations and lessons learned, as an indirect channel into understanding Chinese thinking about the issue. In those exchanges, one topic that was often raised is how Japanese civil society has engaged with the country’s overseas development apparatus and held it accountable, a task that is considered particularly challenging for their Chinese counterparts. For the past 30+ years, Mekong Watch has followed Japanese developmental entities in their activities across the Mekong region. The Japanese NGO has accumulated precious first-hand knowledge – in Mekong countries and in Tokyo – on how the Japanese overseas development apparatus approaches accountability and sustainability.

PPDC recently had the chance to interview Mr. Toshiyuki Doi (Toshi), a Mekong Watch staff who has been based in Bangkok for over twenty years. He shared his insights on the similarities between Japanese and Chinese overseas development assistance and the challenges in introducing accountability.

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PPDC: If you compare Japanese development assistance or finance in the region 20 years ago with Chinese overseas investment today, what similarities and differences do you see?

Toshi: I see a lot more similarities than differences, although I won’t claim I fully understand Chinese ODA and overseas investment.

From my point of view, both have a clear tendency of supporting large scale infrastructure projects, whether it’s hydropower or road construction. There may be similar historical backgrounds behind this. When I asked Japanese government officials why Japan focuses on large scale infrastructure in overseas development, they said infrastructure was fundamental to economic development. They very strongly buy into the model of “infrastructure first, then development follows”. In Japan’s own case, it has re-industrialized and recovered from war time devastations by building large-scale infrastructure including hydropower dams and high-speed train lines. They borrowed from institutions like the World Bank and successfully paid back all the money.

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A second similarity is that both countries tend to put responsibilities on the shoulders of recipient countries. When it comes to particular issues such as conducting thorough Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA), or compensating affected communities, Japanese officials would say that the main actor responsible for them is the host country government. They try to relegate their own responsibility as a lender.

Finally, in overseas development both countries appear keen to ensure some benefits for their own companies.

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PPDC: As you mentioned, a lot of the dynamics in overseas development are very similar between the two countries. The natural question is whether such features pose challenges to accountability, when, for example, the relegation of responsibility to host country governments is the norm?

Toshi: In overseas development, responsibility is not a clear cut “either or” question. We should clearly differentiate the responsibilities of recipient governments and lenders. From there we can work out the specifics in different cases. For example, on the issue of compensation, maybe the recipient governments will do the distribution, but the lender should make sure that compensation actually reaches the affected communities. The lender has the overseeing responsibility.

There are structural issues around large-scale infrastructure projects when it comes to accountability. The state agencies responsible are often understaffed. Conducting thorough due diligence for development projects requires specialized expertise in environmental and social issues. If you look at JBIC or even ADB, they don’t have enough expertise, especially to safeguard environmental and social impacts. Structurally there is a bias toward economic, finance and engineering backgrounds in their staff. [...]

Another key challenge to accountability is the mentality in these institutions. To ensure accountability, you always have to be open to feedback from stakeholders, particularly affected communities. But here comes a cultural factor. The very concept of “complaint” is culturally charged. Some Japanese bureaucrats might overreact as they feel that their face or reputation is jeopardized by simply receiving complaints. [...]

PPDC: How does civil society overcome such accountability challenges? In the East Asian context, CSOs often do not have equal standing with other stakeholders such as government agencies or the private sector.

Toshi: In Japan, CSOs fought to have access to the decision-making process on overseas aid and investment. [...]

PPDC: In recent years your work has also begun to cover Chinese-invested projects in the Mekong region, such as dam projects in Cambodia. What challenges do you have when working on such projects?

Toshi: The most difficult thing is the lack of access to Chinese actors. The Japanese experience shows that dialogue is important. To start the dialogue process, you need to reach out first. Compared to the earlier experience of Japanese CSOs trying to establish communication channels with Japanese stakeholders, it’s even more difficult to do so with Chinese stakeholders in the region. That’s why having Chinese civil society in the network to help build bridges is crucial.